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We analyze the prandom pseudo random number generator (PRNG) in use in theLinux kernel (which is the kernel of the Linux operating system, as well as ofAndroid) and demonstrate that this PRNG is weak. The prandom PRNG is in use bymany "consumers" in the Linux kernel. We focused on three consumers at thenetwork level -- the UDP source port generation algorithm, the IPv6 flow labelgeneration algorithm and the IPv4 ID generation algorithm. The flawed prandomPRNG is shared by all these consumers, which enables us to mount "cross layerattacks" against the Linux kernel. In these attacks, we infer the internalstate of the prandom PRNG from one OSI layer, and use it to either predict thevalues of the PRNG employed by the other OSI layer, or to correlate it to aninternal state of the PRNG inferred from the other protocol.  Using this approach we can mount a very efficient DNS cache poisoning attackagainst Linux. We collect TCP/IPv6 flow label values, or UDP source ports, orTCP/IPv4 IP ID values, reconstruct the internal PRNG state, then predict anoutbound DNS query UDP source port, which speeds up the attack by a factor ofx3000 to x6000. This attack works remotely, but can also be mounted locally,across Linux users and across containers, and (depending on the stub resolver)can poison the cache with an arbitrary DNS record. Additionally, we canidentify and track Linux and Android devices -- we collect TCP/IPv6 flow labelvalues and/or UDP source port values and/or TCP/IPv4 ID fields, reconstruct thePRNG internal state and correlate this new state to previously extracted PRNGstates to identify the same device.

Cross Layer Attacks and How to Use Them (for DNS Cache Poisoning, Device Tracking and More)