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How to guarantee that firms perform due diligence before launchingpotentially dangerous products? We study the design of liability rules when (i)limited liability prevents firms from internalizing the full damage they maycause, (ii) penalties are paid only if damage occurs, regardless of theproduct's inherent riskiness, (iii) firms have private information about theirproducts' riskiness before performing due diligence. We show that (i) anyliability mechanism can be implemented by a tariff that depends only on theevidence acquired by the firm if a damage occurs, not on any initial report bythe firm about its private information, (ii) firms that assign a higher priorto product riskiness always perform more due diligence but less than issocially optimal, and (iii) under a simple and intuitive condition, anytype-specific launch thresholds can be implemented by a monotonic tariff.

Liability Design with Information Acquisition