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We study a portfolio management problem featuring many-player and mean fieldcompetition, investment and consumption, and relative performance concernsunder the forward performance processes (FPP) framework. We focus on agentsusing power (CRRA) type FPPs for their investment-consumption optimizationproblem under a common noise Merton market model. We solve both the many-playerand mean field game providing closed-form expressions for the solutions wherethe limit of the former yields the latter. In our case, the FPP frameworkyields a continuum of solutions for the consumption component as indexed to amarket parameter we coin "market-risk relative consumption preference". Theparameter permits the agent to set a preference for their consumption goingforward in time that, in the competition case, reflects a common marketbehaviour. We show the FPP framework, under both competition andno-competition, allows the agent to disentangle her risk-tolerance andelasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) just like Epstein-Zinpreferences under recursive utility framework and unlike the classical utilitytheory one. This, in turn, allows a finer analysis on the agent's consumption"income" and "substitution" regimes, and, of independent interest, motivates anew strand of economics research on EIS under the FPP framework. We find thatcompetition rescales the agent's perception of consumption in a non-trivialmanner. We provide numerical illustrations of our results.

Forward utility and market adjustments in relative investment-consumption games of many players