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Despite the tremendous successes of science in providing knowledge andtechnologies, the Replication Crisis has highlighted that scientificinstitutions have much room for improvement. Peer-review is one target ofcriticism and suggested reforms. However, despite numerous controversies peerreview systems, plus the obvious complexity of the incentives affecting thedecisions of authors and reviewers, there is very little systematic andstrategic analysis of peer-review systems. In this paper, we begin to addressthis feature of the peer-review literature by applying the tools of gametheory. We use simulations to develop an evolutionary model based around a gameplayed by authors and reviewers, before exploring some of its tendencies. Inparticular, we examine the relative impact of double-blind peer-review and openreview on incentivising reviewer effort under a variety of parameters. We alsocompare (a) the impact of one review system versus another with (b) otheralterations, such as higher costs of reviewing. We find that is no reliabledifference between peer-review systems in our model. Furthermore, under someconditions, higher payoffs for good reviewing can lead to less (rather thanmore) author effort under open review. Finally, compared to the otherparameters that we vary, it is the exogenous utility of author effort thatmakes an important and reliable difference in our model, which raises thepossibility that peer-review might not be an important target for institutionalreforms.

Double blind vs. open review: an evolutionary game logit-simulating the behavior of authors and reviewers