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Since its debut, SGX has been used in many applications, e.g., secure dataprocessing. However, previous systems usually assume a trusted enclave andignore the security issues caused by an untrusted enclave. For instance, avulnerable (or even malicious) third-party enclave can be exploited to attackthe host application and the rest of the system. In this paper, we propose anefficient mechanism to confine an untrusted enclave's behaviors. The threats ofan untrusted enclave come from the enclave-host asymmetries. They can be abusedto access arbitrary memory regions of its host application, jump to any codelocation after leaving the enclave and forge the stack register to manipulatethe saved context. Our solution breaks such asymmetries and establishes mutualdistrust between the host application and the enclave. It leverages Intel MPKfor efficient memory isolation and the x86 single-step debugging mechanism tocapture the event when an enclave is existing. It then performs the integritycheck for the jump target and the stack pointer. We have solved two practicalchallenges and implemented a prototype system. The evaluation with multiplemicro-benchmarks and representative real-world applications demonstrated theefficiency of our system, with less than 4% performance overhead.

Towards Efficiently Establishing Mutual Distrust Between Host Application and Enclave for SGX