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Recent Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) schemes enable secure searchingover an encrypted database stored in a server while limiting the informationleaked to the server. These schemes focus on hiding the access pattern, whichrefers to the set of documents that match the client's queries. This providesprotection against current attacks that largely depend on this leakage tosucceed. However, most SSE constructions also leak whether or not two queriesaim for the same keyword, also called the search pattern.  In this work, we show that search pattern leakage can severely underminecurrent SSE defenses. We propose an attack that leverages both access andsearch pattern leakage, as well as some background and query distributioninformation, to recover the keywords of the queries performed by the client.Our attack follows a maximum likelihood estimation approach, and is easy toadapt against SSE defenses that obfuscate the access pattern. We empiricallyshow that our attack is efficient, it outperforms other proposed attacks, andit completely thwarts two out of the three defenses we evaluate it against,even when these defenses are set to high privacy regimes. These findingshighlight that hiding the search pattern, a feature that most constructions arelacking, is key towards providing practical privacy guarantees in SSE.

Hiding the Access Pattern is Not Enough: Exploiting Search Pattern Leakage in Searchable Encryption