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Blockchain protocols differ in fundamental ways, including the mechanics ofselecting users to produce blocks (e.g., proof-of-work vs. proof-of-stake) andthe method to establish consensus (e.g., longest chain rules vs. Byzantinefault-tolerant (BFT) inspired protocols). These fundamental differences havehindered "apples-to-apples" comparisons between different categories ofblockchain protocols and, in turn, the development of theory to formallydiscuss their relative merits.  This paper presents a parsimonious abstraction sufficient for capturing andcomparing properties of many well-known permissionless blockchain protocols,simultaneously capturing essential properties of both proof-of-work (PoW) andproof-of-stake (PoS) protocols, and of both longest-chain-type and BFT-typeprotocols. Our framework blackboxes the precise mechanics of the user selectionprocess, allowing us to isolate the properties of the selection process thatare significant for protocol design.  We demonstrate the utility of our general framework with several concreteresults:  1. We prove a CAP-type impossibility theorem asserting that liveness with anunknown level of participation rules out security in a partially synchronoussetting.  2. Delving deeper into the partially synchronous setting, we prove that anecessary and sufficient condition for security is the production of"certificates," meaning stand-alone proofs of block confirmation.  3. Restricting to synchronous settings, we prove that typical protocols witha known level of participation (including longest chain-type PoS protocols) canbe adapted to provide certificates, but those with an unknown level ofparticipation cannot.  4. Finally, we use our framework to articulate a modular two-step approach toblockchain security analysis that effectively reduces the permissionless caseto the permissioned case.

A General Framework for the Security Analysis of Blockchain Protocols