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Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol bywhich the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiverusing multiple channels. An adversary can corrupt a subset of the channels andcommit eavesdropping and tampering attacks over the channels. In this work, weintroduce a game-theoretic security model for SMT in which adversaries havesome preferences for protocol execution. We define rational "timid" adversarieswho prefer to violate security requirements but do not prefer the tampering tobe detected.  First, we consider the basic setting where a single adversary attacks theprotocol. We construct perfect SMT protocols against any rational adversarycorrupting all but one of the channels. Since minority corruption is requiredin the traditional setting, our results demonstrate a way of circumventing thecryptographic impossibility results by a game-theoretic approach.  Next, we study the setting in which all the channels can be corrupted bymultiple adversaries who do not cooperate. Since we cannot hope for anysecurity if a single adversary corrupts all the channels or multipleadversaries cooperate maliciously, the scenario can arise from a game-theoreticmodel. We also study the scenario in which both malicious and rationaladversaries exist.

Perfectly Secure Message Transmission against Rational Adversaries