English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferencesover n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinalvaluation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as tomaximize the social welfare. Most of the related literature, however, assumesthat the values of the agents are not a priori known, and only access to theordinal preferences of the agents over the items is provided. Consequently,this incomplete information leads to loss of efficiency, which is measured bythe notion of distortion. In this paper, we further assume that the agents cananswer a small number of queries, allowing us partial access to their values.We study the interplay between elicited cardinal information (measured by thenumber of queries per agent) and distortion for one-sided matching, as well asa wide range of well-studied related problems. Qualitatively, our results showthat with a limited number of queries, it is possible to obtain significantimprovements over the classic setting, where only access to ordinal informationis given.

A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching