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In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU)coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary withincertain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalisethe notion of "robust CORE". Our main contribution is to design two distributedalgorithms, namely, distributed payoff allocation and distributed bargaining,that converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust CORE. We adoptan operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithmsexecuted on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimizationapplication motivates our framework for "robust coalitional games".

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks