English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We study a model of electoral accountability and selection wherebyheterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data intopersonalized signals through paying limited attention. Extreme voters' signalsexhibit an own-party bias, which hampers their ability to discern the good andbad performances of the incumbent. While this effect alone would undermineelectoral accountability and selection, there is a countervailing effectstemming from partisan disagreement, which makes the centrist voter more likelyto be pivotal. In case the latter's unbiased signal is very informative aboutthe incumbent's performance, the combined effect on electoral accountabilityand selection can actually be a positive one. For this reason, factors thatcarry a negative connotation in every political discourse -- such as increasingmass polarization and shrinking attention span -- have ambiguous accountabilityand selection effects in general. Correlating voters' signals, if doneappropriately, unambiguously improves electoral accountability and selectionand, hence, voter welfare.

Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation