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Consider the problem of mitigating the impact on data integrity of phasormeasurement units (PMUs) given a GPS spoofing attack. We present a sparse errorcorrection framework to treat PMU measurements that are potentially corrupteddue to a GPS spoofing attack. We exploit the sparse nature of a GPS spoofingattack, which is that only a small fraction of PMUs are affected by the attack.We first present attack identifiability conditions (in terms of networktopology, PMU locations, and the number of spoofed PMUs) under which datamanipulation by the spoofing attack is identifiable. The identifiabilityconditions have important implications on how the locations of PMUs affecttheir resilience to GPS spoofing attacks. To effectively correct spoofed PMUdata, we present a sparse error correction approach wherein computation tasksare decomposed into smaller zones to ensure scalability. We presentexperimental results obtained from numerical simulations with the IEEE RTS-96and IEEE 300 test networks to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposedapproach.

On PMU Data Integrity under GPS Spoofing Attacks: A Sparse Error Correction Framework