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The arisen of Bitcoin has led to much enthusiasm for blockchain research andblock mining, and the extensive existence of mining pools helps itsparticipants (i.e., miners) gain reward more frequently. Recently, the miningpools are proved to be vulnerable for several possible attacks, and pool blockwithholding attack is one of them: one strategic pool manager sends some of herminers to other pools and these miners pretend to work on the puzzles butactually do nothing. And these miners still get reward since the pool managercan not recognize these malicious miners. In this work, we revisit thegame-theoretic model for pool block withholding attacks and propose a revisedapproach to reallocate the reward to the miners. Fortunately, in the new model,the pool managers have strong incentive to not launch such attacks. We showthat for any number of mining pools, no-pool-attacks is always a Nashequilibrium. Moreover, with only two minority mining pools participating,no-pool-attacks is actually the unique Nash equilibrium.

Discouraging Pool Block Withholding Attacks in Bitcoins