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We set up a supply-side game-theoretic model for the cooperative productionof virtual products. In our model, a group of producers collaboratively producea virtual product by contributing costly input resources to a productioncoalition. Producers are capacitated, i.e., they cannot contribute moreresources than their capacity limits. Our model is an abstraction of emerginginternet-based business models such as federated learning and crowd computing.To maintain an efficient and stable production coalition, the coordinatorshould share with producers the income brought by the virtual product. Besidesthe demand-side information asymmetry, another two sources of supply-sideinformation asymmetry intertwined in this problem: 1) the capacity limit ofeach producer and 2) the cost incurred to each producer. In this paper, werigorously prove that a supply-side mechanism from the VCG family, PVCG, canovercome such multiple information asymmetry and guarantee truthfulness.Furthermore, with some reasonable assumptions, PVCG simultaneously attainstruthfulness, ex-post allocative efficiency, ex-post individual rationality,and ex-post weak budget balancedness on the supply side, easing the well-knowntension between these four objectives in the mechanism design literature.

Optimal Procurement Auction for Cooperative Production of Virtual Products: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Meet Cremer-McLean