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Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switchthe processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While theenclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, itcannot withstand memory corruption errors inside the enclave code. In thispaper, we show that the attack surface of SGX enclaves provides new challengesfor enclave developers as exploitable memory corruption vulnerabilities areeasily introduced into enclave code. We develop TeeRex to automatically analyzeenclave binary code for vulnerabilities introduced at the host-to-enclaveboundary by means of symbolic execution. Our evaluation on public enclavebinaries reveal that many of them suffer from memory corruption errors allowingan attacker to corrupt function pointers or perform arbitrary memory writes. Aswe will show, TeeRex features a specifically tailored framework for SGXenclaves that allows simple proof-of-concept exploit construction to assess thediscovered vulnerabilities. Our findings reveal vulnerabilities in multipleenclaves, including enclaves developed by Intel, Baidu, and WolfSSL, as well asbiometric fingerprint software deployed on popular laptop brands.

TeeRex: Discovery and Exploitation of Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities in SGX Enclaves