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We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from anormative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in whichagents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. Inthis setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individualbehaviours and network structure. First, we exhibit an upper bound on the Priceof Anarchy and prove that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearlywith the number of agents. Second, we prove that policies of uniform reductionof interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks.In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, weconsider as a type of second-best policy the shift from a local to a globalgame by allowing agents to subsidise investments in contagiousness reduction inthe global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope forPareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price ofAutarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a localequilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can beextremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy cantake advantage of the network structure to design efficient containmentpolicies.

Prophylaxis of Epidemic Spreading with Transient Dynamics