English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Many real-world situations of ethical relevance, in particular those oflarge-scale social choice such as mitigating climate change, involve not onlymany agents whose decisions interact in complicated ways, but also variousforms of uncertainty, including quantifiable risk and unquantifiable ambiguity.In such problems, an assessment of individual and groupwise moralresponsibility for ethically undesired outcomes or their responsibility toavoid such is challenging and prone to the risk of under- or overdeterminationof responsibility. In contrast to existing approaches based on strict causationor certain deontic logics that focus on a binary classification of`responsible' vs `not responsible', we here present several differentquantitative responsibility metrics that assess responsibility degrees in unitsof probability. For this, we use a framework based on an adapted version ofextensive-form game trees and an axiomatic approach that specifies a number ofpotentially desirable properties of such metrics, and then test the developedcandidate metrics by their application to a number of paradigmatic socialchoice situations. We find that while most properties one might desire of suchresponsibility metrics can be fulfilled by some variant, an optimal metric thatclearly outperforms others has yet to be found.

Degrees of individual and groupwise backward and forward responsibility  in extensive-form games with ambiguity, and their application to social  choice problems