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The Lightning Network is a scaling solution for Bitcoin that promises toenable rapid and private payment processing. In Lightning, multi-hop paymentsare secured by utilizing Hashed Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) and encrypted onthe network layer by an onion routing scheme to avoid information leakage tointermediate nodes. In this work, we however show that the privacy guaranteesof the Lightning Network may be subverted by an on-path adversary conductingtiming attacks on the HTLC state negotiation messages. To this end, we provideestimators that enable an adversary to reduce the anonymity set and infer thelikeliest payment endpoints. We developed a proof-of-concept measurement nodethat shows the feasibility of attaining time differences and evaluate theadversarial success in model-based network simulations. We find thatcontrolling a small number malicious nodes is sufficient to observe a largeshare of all payments, emphasizing the relevance of the on-path adversarymodel. Moreover, we show that adversaries of different magnitudes could employtiming-based attacks to deanonymize payment endpoints with high precision andrecall.

Counting Down Thunder: Timing Attacks on Privacy in Payment Channel Networks