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We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a powersystem. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power systemcovertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid isreduced, driving the entire system towards a voltage collapse. The defender, orthe system operator, aims to compensate for this reduction by retuning thereactive power injection to the grid by switching on control devices, such as abank of shunt capacitors. A modified Backward Induction method is proposed tofind a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) of the game, which saves theplayers' costs while providing the optimal allocation of both players'investment resources under budget and covertness constraints. We analyze theproposed game extensively for the IEEE 9-bus power system model and present anexample of its performance for the IEEE 39-bus power system model. It isdemonstrated that the defender is able to maintain system stability unless itssecurity budget is much lower than the attacker's budget.

A Stackelberg Security Investment Game for Voltage Stability of Power Systems