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In this paper, we identify that memory performance plays a crucial role inthe feasibility and effectiveness for performing denial-of-service attacks onshared cache. Based on this insight, we introduce new cache DoS attacks, whichcan be mounted from the user-space and can cause extreme worst-case executiontime (WCET) impacts to cross-core victims -- even if the shared cache ispartitioned -- by taking advantage of the platform's memory address mappinginformation and HugePage support. We deploy these enhanced attacks on twopopular embedded out-of-order multicore platforms using both synthetic andreal-world benchmarks. The proposed DoS attacks achieve up to 111X WCETincreases on the tested platforms.

Memory-Aware Denial-of-Service Attacks on Shared Cache in Multicore Real-Time Systems