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Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concernsstemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increasedthird-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramountimportance for ensuring systems with confidentiality, integrity, andavailability. Existing methods for hardware Trojan detection in FPGA (fieldprogrammable gate array) devices include test-time methods, pre-implementationmethods, and run-time methods. The first two methods provide effective ways ofdetecting some Trojans; however, Trojans may be specifically designed to avoiddetection at test-time or before implementation making run-time detection amore attractive option. Run-time detection and removal of Trojans is highlydesirable due to the wide range of critical systems which are deployed on FPGAsand may be difficult or costly to remove from operation. Many parallels can bedrawn between hardware and natural systems, and one example creates an analogybetween hardware attacks and biological attacks. We propose aCRISPR-Cas-inspired (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic repeats)method for detecting hardware Trojans in FPGAs. The fundamental concepts of theType 1-E CRISPR-Cas mechanism are discussed and simulated to predict the flowof genetic information through this biological system. The basic structure ofthis system is utilized to propose a novel run-time Trojan detection methodtitled CADEFT (CRISPR-Cas-based Algorithm for DEtection of FPGA Trojans).Different levels of FPGA application design flow are explored, and CADEFT isproposed for realization at the bitstream level to monitor the configurationbitstream and the run-time properties of the FPGA. The flexibility of CADEFToriginates in the CRISPR-Cas mechanism's ability to recognize similar albeitpreviously unseen patterns which may pose a threat to the system.

A CRISPR-Cas-Inspired Mechanism for Detecting Hardware Trojans in FPGA Devices