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We consider a spatial model of the emergence of cooperation with synchronousbirths and deaths. Agents bear a tag and interact with their neighbors byplaying the prisoner's dilemma game with strategies depending on their own andopponent's tags. An agent's payoff determines its chances of reproducing andpassing on its strategy. We show that when tags are assigned at random ratherthan inherited, a significant heterophilic population of about 40~\% of thewhole can emerge and persist. Heterophilics defect on agents bearing the sametag as theirs and cooperate with others. In our setting, the emergence ofheterophily is explained by the correlation between an agent's payoff and itsneighbors' payoffs. The advantage of heterophily over homophily (cooperatingwith agents bearing one's tag and defecting with others) when tags are assignedat random makes the emergence of the later an even more interesting phenomenonthan previously thought.

Random tags can sustain high heterophily levels