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In modern embedded systems, the trust in comprehensive security standards allalong the product life cycle has become an increasingly importantaccess-to-market requirement. However, these security standards rely onmandatory immunity assumptions such as the integrity and authenticity of aninitial system configuration typically loaded from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM).This applies especially to FPGA-based Programmable System-on-Chip (PSoC)architectures, since object codes as well as configuration data easily exceedthe capacity of a secure bootROM. In this context, an attacker could try toalter the content of the NVM device in order to manipulate the system. The PSoCtherefore relies on the integrity of the NVM particularly at boot-time. In thispaper, we propose a methodology for securely booting from an NVM in apotentially unsecure environment by exploiting the reconfigurable logic of theFPGA. Here, the FPGA serves as a secure anchor point by performing requiredintegrity and authenticity verifications prior to the configuration andexecution of any user application loaded from the NVM on the PSoC. The proposedsecure boot process is based on the following assumptions and steps: 1) Theboot configurationis stored on a fully encrypted Secure Digital memory card (SDcard) or alternatively Flash acting as NVM. 2) At boot time, a hardware designcalled Trusted Memory-Interface Unit (TMIU) is loaded to verify first theauthenticity of the deployed NVM and then after decryption the integrity of itscontent. To demonstrate the practicability of our approach, we integrated themethodology into the vendor-specific secure boot process of a Xilinx Zynq PSoCand evaluated the design objectives performance, power and resource costs.

Secure Boot from Non-Volatile Memory for Programmable SoC Architectures