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Air-gap covert channels are special types of covert communication channelsthat enable attackers to exfiltrate data from isolated, network-less computers.Various types of air-gap covert channels have been demonstrated over the years,including electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic, optical, and thermal.  In this paper, we introduce a new type of vibrational (seismic) covertchannel. We observe that computers vibrate at a frequency correlated to therotation speed of their internal fans. These inaudible vibrations affect theentire structure on which the computer is placed. Our method is based onmalware's capability of controlling the vibrations generated by a computer, byregulating its internal fan speeds. We show that the malware-generated covertvibrations can be sensed by nearby smartphones via the integrated, sensitive\textit{accelerometers}. Notably, the accelerometer sensors in smartphones canbe accessed by any app without requiring the user permissions, which make thisattack highly evasive. We implemented AiR-ViBeR, malware that encodes binaryinformation, and modulate it over a low frequency vibrational carrier. The datais then decoded by malicious application on a smartphone placed on the samesurface (e.g., on a desk). We discuss the attack model, provide technicalbackground, and present the implementation details and evaluation results. Ourresults show that using AiR-ViBeR, data can be exfiltrated from air-gappedcomputer to a nearby smartphone on the same table, or even an adjacent table,via vibrations. Finally, we propose a set of countermeasures for this new typeof attack.

AiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Surface ViBrAtIoNs