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Hardware intellectual property (IP) theft is a major issue in today'sglobalized supply chain. To address it, numerous logic locking and obfuscationtechniques have been proposed. While locking initially focused on digitalintegrated circuits (ICs), there have been recent attempts to extend it toanalog ICs, which are easier to reverse engineer and to copy than digital ICs.In this paper, we use algorithms based on evolutionary strategies toinvestigate the security of analog obfuscation/locking techniques. We present agenetic algorithm (GA) approach which is capable of completely breaking alocked analog circuit by finding either its obfuscation key or its obfuscatedparameters. We implement both the GA attack as well as a more naivesatisfiability modulo theory (SMT)-based attack on common analog benchmarkcircuits obfuscated by combinational locking and parameter biasing. We findthat GA attack can unlock all the circuits using only the locked netlist and anunlocked chip in minutes. On the other hand, while the SMT attack convergesfaster, it requires circuit specification to execute and it also returnsmultiple keys that need to be brute-forced by a post-processing step. We alsodiscuss how the GA attack can generalize to other recent analog lockingtechniques not tested in the paper

Attack of the Genes: Finding Keys and Parameters of Locked Analog ICs Using Genetic Algorithm