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Mathematically-secure cryptographic algorithms leak significant side channelinformation through their power supplies when implemented on a physicalplatform. These side channel leakages can be exploited by an attacker toextract the secret key of an embedded device. The existing state-of-the-artcountermeasures mainly focus on the power balancing, gate-level masking, orsignal-to-noise (SNR) reduction using noise injection and signatureattenuation, all of which suffer either from the limitations of high power/areaoverheads, performance degradation or are not synthesizable. In this article,we propose a generic low-overhead digital-friendly power SCA countermeasureutilizing physical Time-Varying Transfer Functions (TVTF) by randomly shufflingdistributed switched capacitors to significantly obfuscate the traces in thetime domain. System-level simulation results of the TVTF-AES implemented inTSMC 65nm CMOS technology show > 4000x MTD improvement over the unprotectedimplementation with nearly 1.25x power and 1.2x area overheads, and without anyperformance degradation.

Physical Time-Varying Transfer Functions as Generic Low-Overhead Power-SCA Countermeasure