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In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive study of user-chosen 4- and6-digit PINs (n=1220) collected on smartphones with participants beingexplicitly primed for device unlocking. We find that against a throttledattacker (with 10, 30, or 100 guesses, matching the smartphone unlock setting),using 6-digit PINs instead of 4-digit PINs provides little to no increase insecurity, and surprisingly may even decrease security. We also study theeffects of blocklists, where a set of "easy to guess" PINs is disallowed duringselection. Two such blocklists are in use today by iOS, for 4-digits (274 PINs)as well as 6-digits (2910 PINs). We extracted both blocklists compared themwith four other blocklists, including a small 4-digit (27 PINs), a large4-digit (2740 PINs), and two placebo blocklists for 4- and 6-digit PINs thatalways excluded the first-choice PIN. We find that relatively small blocklistsin use today by iOS offer little or no benefit against a throttled guessingattack. Security gains are only observed when the blocklists are much larger,which in turn comes at the cost of increased user frustration. Our analysissuggests that a blocklist at about 10% of the PIN space may provide the bestbalance between usability and security.

This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs