English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Temporal memory corruptions are commonly exploited software vulnerabilitiesthat can lead to powerful attacks. Despite significant progress made by decadesof research on mitigation techniques, existing countermeasures fall short dueto either limited coverage or overly high overhead. Furthermore, they requireexternal mechanisms (e.g., spatial memory safety) to protect their metadata.Otherwise, their protection can be bypassed or disabled. To address theselimitations, we present robust points-to authentication, a novel runtime schemefor detecting all kinds of temporal memory corruptions. We built a prototypesystem, called PTAuth, that realizes this scheme on ARM architectures. PTAuthcontains a customized compiler for code analysis and instrumentation and aruntime library for performing the points-to authentication as a protectedprogram runs. PTAuth leverages the Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) feature,provided by the ARMv8.3 and later CPUs, which serves as a simple hardware-basedencryption primitive. PTAuth uses minimal in-memory metadata and protects itsmetadata without requiring spatial memory safety. We report our evaluation ofPTAuth in terms of security, robustness and performance using 150 vulnerableprograms from Juliet test suite and the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. PTAuth detectsall three categories of heap-based temporal memory corruptions, generates zerofalse alerts, and slows down program execution by 26% (this number was measuredbased on software-emulated PAC; it is expected to decrease to 20% when usinghardware-based PAC). We also show that PTAuth incurs 2% memory overhead thanksto the efficient use of metadata.

PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication