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In our previous work, it was demonstrated that the attacker could notpin-down the correct keys to start the Y00 protocol with a probability of oneunder the assistance of unlimitedly long known-plaintext attacks and optimalquantum measurements on the attacker's quantum memory. However, there wereseveral assumptions that the Y00 system utilized linear-feedback shiftregisters as pseudo-random-number generators, and a fast correlation attack wasdisabled by irregular mapping on the Y00 systems. This study generalizes suchan attack to remove the assumptions of the previous work. The framework of thesecurity analyses of this study reiterates two well-known results from thepast: (1) Y00 systems would be cryptanalyzed when the system is not designedwell; (2) the system is possibly information-theoretically secure when thesystem is designed well, although the attacker's confidence in the correct keyincreases over time but the success probability of key recovery does not reachunity in finite time; (3) the breach time of the shared keys is increasinglythreatened with time. Hence, a key-refreshment procedure for the Y00 protocolis provided herein. Such security analyses are important not only in keyrefreshment but also in initial key agreement situations.

Analysis of Y00 Protocol under Quantum Generalization of a Fast Correlation Attack: Toward Information-Theoretic Security