English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Sharing genome data in a privacy-preserving way stands as a major bottleneckin front of the scientific progress promised by the big data era in genomics. Acommunity-driven protocol named genomic data-sharing beacon protocol has beenwidely adopted for sharing genomic data. The system aims to provide a secure,easy to implement, and standardized interface for data sharing by only allowingyes/no queries on the presence of specific alleles in the dataset. However,beacon protocol was recently shown to be vulnerable against membershipinference attacks. In this paper, we show that privacy threats against genomicdata sharing beacons are not limited to membership inference. We identify andanalyze a novel vulnerability of genomic data-sharing beacons: genomereconstruction. We show that it is possible to successfully reconstruct asubstantial part of the genome of a victim when the attacker knows the victimhas been added to the beacon in a recent update. We also show that even ifmultiple individuals are added to the beacon during the same update, it ispossible to identify the victim's genome with high confidence using traits thatare easily accessible by the attacker (e.g., eye and hair color). Moreover, weshow how the reconstructed genome using a beacon that is not associated with asensitive phenotype can be used for membership inference attacks to beaconswith sensitive phenotypes (i.e., HIV+). The outcome of this work will guidebeacon operators on when and how to update the content of the beacon. Thus,this work will be an important attempt at helping beacon operators andparticipants make informed decisions.

Genome Reconstruction Attacks Against Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons