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Binary analysis is traditionally used in the realm of malware detection.However, the same technique may be employed by an attacker to analyze theoriginal binaries in order to reverse engineer them and extract exploitableweaknesses. When a binary is distributed to end users, it becomes a commonremotely exploitable attack point. Code obfuscation is used to hinder reverseengineering of executable programs. In this paper, we focus on securing binarydistribution, where attackers gain access to binaries distributed to enddevices, in order to reverse engineer them and find potential vulnerabilities.Attackers do not however have means to monitor the execution of said devices.In particular, we focus on the control flow obfuscation --- a technique thatprevents an attacker from restoring the correct reachability conditions for thebasic blocks of a program. By doing so, we thwart attackers in their effort toinfer the inputs that cause the program to enter a vulnerable state (e.g.,buffer overrun). We propose a compiler extension for obfuscation and a minimalhardware modification for dynamic deobfuscation that takes advantage of asecret key stored in hardware. We evaluate our experiments on the LLVM compilertoolchain and the BRISC-V open source processor. On PARSEC benchmarks, ourdeobfuscation technique incurs only a 5\% runtime overhead. We evaluate thesecurity of Drndalo by training classifiers on pairs of obfuscated andunobfuscated binaries. Our results shine light on the difficulty of producingobfuscated binaries of arbitrary programs in such a way that they arestatistically indistinguishable from plain binaries.

Drndalo: Lightweight Control Flow Obfuscation Through Minimal Processor/Compiler Co-Design