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Mobile autonomous systems, robots, and cyber-physical systems rely onaccurate positioning information. To conduct distance-measurement, two devicesexchange signals and, knowing these signals propagate at the speed of light,the time of arrival is used for distance estimations. Existingdistance-measurement techniques are incapable of protecting against adversarialdistance enlargement---a highly devastating tactic in which the adversaryreissues a delayed version of the signals transmitted between devices, afterdistorting the authentic signal to prevent the receiver from identifying it.The adversary need not break crypto, nor compromise any upper-layer securityprotocols for mounting this attack. No known solution currently exists toprotect against distance enlargement. We present \textit{Ultra-WidebandEnlargement Detection} (UWB-ED), a new modulation technique to detect distanceenlargement attacks, and securely verify distances between two mutually trusteddevices. We analyze UWB-ED under an adversary that injects signals toblock/modify authentic signals. We show how UWB-ED is a good candidate for802.15.4z Low Rate Pulse and the 5G standard.

UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-Wideband