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Internet of Things (IoT) is highly vulnerable to emerging Advanced PersistentThreats (APTs) that are often operated by well-resourced adversaries. Achievingperfect security for IoT networks is often cost-prohibitive if not impossible.Cyber insurance is a valuable mechanism to mitigate cyber risks for IoTsystems. In this work, we propose a bi-level game-theoretic framework calledFlipIn to design incentive-compatible and welfare-maximizing cyber insurancecontracts. The framework captures the strategic interactions among APTattackers, IoT defenders, and cyber insurance insurers, and incorporatesinfluence networks to assess the systemic cyber risks of interconnected IoTdevices. The FlipIn framework formulates a game over networks within aprincipal-agent problem of moral-hazard type to design a cyber risk-awareinsurance contract. We completely characterize the equilibrium solutions of thebi-level games for a network of distributed defenders and a semi-homogeneouscentralized defender and show that the optimal insurance contracts cover halfof the defenders' losses. Our framework predicts the risk compensation ofdefenders and the Peltzman effect of insurance. We study a centralized securitymanagement scenario and its decentralized counterpart, and leverage numericalexperiments to show that network connectivity plays an important role in thesecurity of the IoT devices and the insurability of both distributed andcentralized defenders.

FlipIn: A Game-Theoretic Cyber Insurance Framework for Incentive-Compatible Cyber Risk Management of Internet of Things