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Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in whicha group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure anoutcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they votehonestly. The present paper is devoted to study coalitional manipulabilitywithin the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any number ofalternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing to characterize all theoutcomes that can be manipulable by a coalition of voters. This gives us thepossibility to find the probability of manipulable outcomes for somewell-studied scoring voting rules in case of small number of alternatives andlarge electorates under a well-known assumption on individual preferenceprofiles.

Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules