English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

The price of anarchy (PoA) is a popular metric for analyzing the inefficiencyof self-interested decision making. Although its study is widespread,characterizing the PoA can be challenging. A commonly employed approach isbased on the smoothness framework, which provides tight PoA values under theassumption that the system objective consists in the sum of the agents'individual welfares. Unfortunately, several important classes of problems donot satisfy this requirement (e.g., taxation in congestion games), and ourfirst result demonstrates that the smoothness framework does *not* tightlycharacterize the PoA for such settings. Motivated by this observation, thiswork develops a framework that achieves two chief objectives: i) to tightlycharacterize the PoA for such scenarios, and ii) to do so through a tractableapproach. As a direct consequence, the proposed framework recovers andgeneralizes many existing PoA results, and enables efficient computation ofincentives that optimize the PoA. We conclude by highlighting the applicabilityof our contributions to incentive design in congestion games and utility designin distributed welfare games.

When Smoothness is Not Enough: Toward Exact Quantification and Optimization of the Price of Anarchy