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Wireless devices resorting to event-triggered communications have been provedto suffer critical privacy issues, due to the intrinsic leakage associated withradio-frequency (RF) emissions. In this paper, we move the attack frontierforward by proposing BrokenStrokes: an inexpensive, easy to implement,efficient, and effective attack able to detect the typing of a pre-definedkeyword by only eavesdropping the communication channel used by the wirelesskeyboard. BrokenStrokes proves itself to be a particularly dreadful attack: itachieves its goal when the eavesdropping antenna is up to 15 meters from thetarget keyboard, regardless of the encryption scheme, the communicationprotocol, the presence of radio noise, and the presence of physical obstacles.While we detail the attack in three current scenarios and discuss its strikingperformance--its success probability exceeds 90% in normal operatingconditions--, we also provide some suggestions on how to mitigate it. The datautilized in this paper have been released as open-source to allowpractitioners, industries, and academia to verify our claims and use them as abasis for further developments.

BrokenStrokes: On the (in)Security of Wireless Keyboards