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Investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investmentprocess until the point of complete delegation on investment decisions. Surely,financial advice is potentially a correcting factor in investment decisionsbut, in the past, the media and regulators blamed biased advisors formanipulating the expectations of naive investors. In order to give an analyticformulation of the problem, we present an Agent-Based Model formed byindividual investors and a financial advisor. We parametrize the games byconsidering a compromise for the financial advisor (between a sufficient rewardby bank and to keep his/her reputation), and a compromise for the customers(between the desired return and the proposed return by advisor). Then we obtainthe Nash equilibria and the best response functions of the resulting game. Wealso describe the parameter regions in which these points result acceptableequilibria and the greediness/naivety of the customers emerge naturally fromthe model. Finally, we focus on the efficiency of the best Nash equilibrium.

Personal Finance Decisions with Untruthful Advisors: an Agent-Based Model