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Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for asustainable environment. A special case in which such services are mostapplicable, is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that allthe passengers are positioned at the same origin location (e.g. an airport),and each have a different destination. One of the major issues in a shared rideis fairly splitting of the ride cost among the passengers.  In this paper we use the Shapley value, which is one of the most significantsolution concepts in cooperative game theory, for fairly splitting the cost ofa shared ride. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario there exists afixed priority order in which the passengers are dropped-off (e.g. elderly,injured etc.), and we show a method for efficient computation of the Shapleyvalue in this setting. Our results are also applicable for efficientcomputation of the Shapley value in routing games.  In the second scenario there is no predetermined priority order. We show thatthe Shapley value cannot be efficiently computed in this setting. However,extensive simulations reveal that our approach for the first scenario can serveas an excellent proxy for the second scenario, outperforming other knownproxies.

Fair Sharing: The Shapley Value for Ride-Sharing and Routing Games