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This article explores the following methodological principle for theoryconstruction in physics: if an ontological theory predicts two scenarios thatare ontologically distinct but empirically indiscernible, then this theoryshould be rejected and replaced by one relative to which the scenarios areontologically the same. I defend the thesis that this methodological principlewas first articulated by Leibniz as a version of his principle of the identityof indiscernibles, and that it was applied repeatedly to great effect byEinstein in his development of the special and general theories of relativity.I argue for an interpretation of the principle as an inference to the bestexplanation, defend it against some criticisms, discuss its potentialapplications in modern physics, and explain how it provides an attractivemiddle ground in the debate between empiricist and realist philosophies ofscience.

The ontological identity of empirical indiscernibles: Leibniz's methodological principle and its significance in the work of Einstein