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Revenue sharing contracts between Content Providers (CPs) and InternetService Providers (ISPs) can act as leverage for enhancing the infrastructureof the Internet. ISPs can be incentivized to make investments in networkinfrastructure that improve Quality of Service (QoS) for users if attractivecontracts are negotiated between them and CPs. The idea here is that part ofthe net profit gained by CPs are given to ISPs to invest in the network. TheMoral Hazard economic framework is used to model such an interaction, in whicha principal determines a contract, and an agent reacts by adapting her effort.In our setting, several competitive CPs interact through one common ISP. Twocases are studied: (i) the ISP differentiates between the CPs and makes a(potentially) different investment to improve the QoS of each CP, and (ii) theISP does not differentiate between CPs and makes a common investment for both.The last scenario can be viewed as \emph{network neutral behavior} on the partof the ISP. We analyse the optimal contracts and show that the CP that canbetter monetize its demand always prefers the non-neutral regime.Interestingly, ISP revenue, as well as social utility, are also found to behigher under the non-neutral regime.

Revenue Sharing in the Internet: A Moral Hazard Approach and a Net-neutrality Perspective