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Malware writers frequently try to hide the activities of their agents withintunnelled traffic. Within the Kill Chain model the infection time is oftenmeasured in seconds, and if the infection is not detected and blocked, themalware agent, such as a bot, will often then set up a secret channel tocommunicate with its controller. In the case of ransomware the communicatedpayload may include the encryption key used for the infected host to registerits infection. As a malware infection can spread across a network in seconds,it is often important to detect its activities on the air, in memory andat-rest. Malware increasingly uses encrypted channels for communicating withtheir controllers. This paper presents a new approach to discovering thecryptographic artefacts of real malware clients that use cryptographiclibraries of the Microsoft Windows operating system. This enables malwaresecret communications to be discovered without any prior malware knowledge.

Discovering Encrypted Bot and Ransomware Payloads Through Memory Inspection Without A Priori Knowledge