English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Data for controlling a vehicle is exchanged among Electronic Control Units(ECUs) via in-vehicle network protocols such as the Controller Area Network(CAN) protocol. Since these protocols are designed for an isolated network, theprotocols do not encrypt data nor authenticate messages. Intrusion DetectionSystems (IDSs) are developed to secure the CAN protocol by detecting abnormaldeviations in physical properties. For instance, a voltage-based IDS (VIDS)exploits voltage characteristics of each ECU to detect an intrusion. An ECUwith VIDS must be connected to the CAN bus using extra wires to measurevoltages of the CAN bus lines. These extra wires, however, may introduce newattack surfaces to the CAN bus if the ECU with VIDS is compromised. Weinvestigate new vulnerabilities of VIDS and demonstrate that an adversary maydamage an ECU with VIDS, block message transmission, and force an ECU toretransmit messages. In order to defend the CAN bus against these attacks, wepropose two hardware-based Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) that disconnectthe compromised ECU from the CAN bus once these attacks are detected. Wedevelop four voltage-based attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities of VIDS andevaluate the effectiveness of the proposed IRSs using a CAN bus testbed.

Mitigating Vulnerabilities of Voltage-based Intrusion Detection Systems in Controller Area Networks