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It is common in the study of secure multicast network coding in the presenceof an eavesdropper that has access to $z$ network links, to assume that thesource node is the only node that generates random keys. In this setting, thesecure multicast rate is well understood. Computing the secure multicast rate,or even the secure unicast rate, in the more general setting in which allnetwork nodes may generate (independent) random keys is known to be asdifficult as computing the (non-secure) capacity of multiple-unicast networkcoding instances --- a well known open problem. This work treats anintermediate model of secure unicast in which only one node can generate randomkeys, however that node need not be the source node. The secure communicationrate for this setting is characterized again with an eavesdropper that hasaccess to $z$ network links.

Secure Network Coding in the Setting in Which a Non-Source Node May Generate Random Keys