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DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) encrypt DNS to guard user privacyby hiding DNS resolutions from passive adversaries. Yet, past attacks haveshown that encrypted DNS is still sensitive to traffic analysis. As aconsequence, RFC 8467 proposes to pad messages prior to encryption, whichheavily reduces the characteristics of encrypted traffic. In this paper, weshow that padding alone is insufficient to counter DNS traffic analysis. Wepropose a novel traffic analysis method that combines size and timinginformation to infer the websites a user visits purely based on encrypted andpadded DNS traces. To this end, we model DNS sequences that capture thecomplexity of websites that usually trigger dozens of DNS resolutions insteadof just a single DNS transaction. A closed world evaluation based on the Alexatop-10k websites reveals that attackers can deanonymize at least half of thetest traces in 80.2% of all websites, and even correctly label all traces for32.0% of the websites. Our findings undermine the privacy goals ofstate-of-the-art message padding strategies in DoT/DoH. We conclude by showingthat successful mitigations to such attacks have to remove the entropy ofinter-arrival timings between query responses.

Padding Ain't Enough: Assessing the Privacy Guarantees of Encrypted DNS