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Selecting the optimal set of countermeasures is a challenging task thatinvolves various considerations and tradeoffs such as prioritizing the risks tomitigate and costs. The vast majority of studies for selecting a countermeasuredeployment are based on a limited risk assessment procedure that utilizes thecommon vulnerability scoring system (CVSS). Such a risk assessment proceduredoes not necessarily consider the prerequisites and exploitability of aspecific asset, cannot distinguish insider from outsider threat actor, and doesnot express the consequences of exploiting a vulnerability as well as theattacker's lateral movements. Other studies applied a more extensive riskassessment procedure that relies on manual work and repeated assessment. Thesesolutions however, do not consider the network topology and do not specify theoptimal position for deploying the countermeasures, and therefore are lesspractical. In this paper we suggest a heuristic search approach for selectingthe optimal countermeasure deployment under a given budget limitation. Theproposed method expresses the risk of the system using an extended attack graphmodeling, which considers the prerequisites and consequences of exploiting avulnerability, examines the attacker's potential lateral movements, and expressthe physical network topology as well as vulnerabilities in network protocols.In addition, unlike previous studies which utilizes attack graph forcountermeasure planning, the proposed methods does not require re-generatingthe attack graph at each stage of the procedure, which is computationallyheavy, and therefore it provides a more accurate and practical countermeasuredeployment planning process.

Heuristic Approach Towards Countermeasure Selection using Attack Graphs