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The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0 provides a two-phase keyexchange primitive which can be used to implement three widely-standardizedauthenticated key exchange protocols: the Full Unified Model, the Full MQV, andthe SM2 key exchange protocols. However, vulnerabilities have been found in allof these protocols. Fortunately, it seems that the protections offered by TPMchips can mitigate these vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a securitymodel which captures TPM's protections on keys and protocols' computationenvironments and in which multiple protocols can be analyzed in a unified way.Based on the unified security model, we give the first formal security analysisof the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, and the analysis results show that,with the help of hardware protections of TPM chips, the key exchange primitiveindeed satisfies the well-defined security property of our security model, butunfortunately under some impractical limiting conditions, which would preventthe application of the key exchange primitive in real-world networks. To makeTPM 2.0 applicable to real-world networks, we present a revision of the keyexchange primitive of TPM 2.0, which can be secure without the limitingconditions. We give a rigorous analysis of our revision, and the results showthat our revision achieves not only the basic security property of modern AKEsecurity models but also some further security properties.

A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis and Revision of the Two-phase Key Exchange Primitive of TPM 2.0