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The operation of critical infrastructures such as the electrical power grid,cellphone towers, and financial institutions relies on precise timing providedby stationary GPS receivers. These GPS devices are vulnerable to a type ofspoofing called Time Synchronization Attack (TSA), whose objective is tomaliciously alter the timing provided by the GPS receiver. The objective ofthis paper is to design a tuning-free, low memory robust estimator to mitigatesuch spoofing attacks. The contribution is that the proposed method dispenseswith several limitations found in the existing state-of-the-art methods in theliterature that require parameter tuning, availability of the statisticaldistributions of noise, real-time optimization, or heavy computations.Specifically, we (i) utilize an observer design for linear systems underunknown inputs, (ii) adjust it to include a state-correction algorithm, (iii)design a realistic experimental setup with real GPS data and sensible spoofingattacks, and (iv) showcase how the proposed tuning-free, low memory robustestimator can combat TSAs. Numerical tests with real GPS data demonstrate thataccurate time can be provided to the user under various attack conditions.

Tuning-Free, Low Memory Robust Estimator to Mitigate GPS Spoofing Attacks