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Spectre attacks and their many subsequent variants are a new vulnerabilityclass affecting modern CPUs. The attacks rely on the ability to misguidespeculative execution, generally by exploiting the branch predictionstructures, to execute a vulnerable code sequence speculatively. In this paper,we propose to use Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), a security technique used tostop control-flow hijacking attacks, on the committed path, to preventspeculative control-flow from being hijacked to launch the most dangerousvariants of the Spectre attacks (Spectre-BTB and Spectre-RSB). Specifically,CFI attempts to constrain the possible targets of an indirect branch to a setof legal targets defined by a pre-calculated control-flow graph (CFG). As CFIis being adopted by commodity software (e.g., Windows and Android) andcommodity hardware (e.g., Intel's CET and ARM's BTI), the CFI informationbecomes readily available through the hardware CFI extensions. With the CFIinformation, we apply CFI principles to also constrain illegal control-flowduring speculative execution. Specifically, our proposed defense, SPECCFI,ensures that control flow instructions target legal destinations to constraindangerous speculation on forward control-flow paths (indirect calls andbranches). We augment this protection with a precise speculation-aware hardwarestack to constrain speculation on backward control-flow edges (returns). Wecombine this solution with existing solutions against branch target predictorattacks (Spectre-PHT) to close all known non-vendor-specific Spectrevulnerabilities. We show that SPECCFI results in small overheads both in termsof performance and additional hardware complexity.

SPECCFI: Mitigating Spectre Attacks using CFI Informed Speculation