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To prevent credential stuffing attacks, industry best practice nowproactively checks if user credentials are present in known data breaches.Recently, some web services, such as HaveIBeenPwned (HIBP) and Google PasswordCheckup (GPC), have started providing APIs to check for breached passwords. Werefer to such services as compromised credential checking (C3) services. Wegive the first formal description of C3 services, detailing different settingsand operational requirements, and we give relevant threat models.  One key security requirement is the secrecy of a user's passwords that arebeing checked. Current widely deployed C3 services have the user share a smallprefix of a hash computed over the user's password. We provide a framework forempirically analyzing the leakage of such protocols, showing that in somecontexts knowing the hash prefixes leads to a 12x increase in the efficacy ofremote guessing attacks. We propose two new protocols that provide strongerprotection for users' passwords, implement them, and show experimentally thatthey remain practical to deploy.

Protocols for Checking Compromised Credentials