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Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) are widely used as authenticationmethod for systems such as Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and Point of Sale(PoS). Input devices (PIN pads) usually give the user a feedback sound when akey is pressed. In this paper, we propose an attack based on the extraction ofinter-keystroke timing from the feedback sound when users type their PINs. Ourattack is able to reach an accuracy of 98% with a mean error of 0.13 +/-6.66milliseconds. We demonstrate that inter-keystroke timing significantly improvesthe guessing probability of certain subsets of PINs. We believe this representsa security problem that has to be taken into account for secure PIN generation.Furthermore, we identified several attack scenarios where the adversary canexploit inter-keystroke timing and additional information about the user or thePIN, such as typing behavior. Our results show that combining theinter-keystroke timing with other information drastically reduces attempts toguess a PIN, outperforming random guessing. With our attack, we are able toguess 72% of the 4-digit PINs within 3 attempts. We believe this poses aserious security problem for systems that use PIN-based authentication.

Your PIN Sounds Good! On The Feasibility of PIN Inference Through Audio Leakage